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Abstract 
The paper provides a selective survey of applications of economics and econometrics 
in economic history focusing especially on the themes of living standards and 
technological change. Cliometric research in these areas is shown to have made 
major contributions to knowledge. It is argued that quantitative economic history is 
distinctive from applied economics and that modelling must be sensitive to historical 
context. Research prospects are exciting both because progress in economic theory 
has increasingly allowed the formalization and quantification of important arguments 
put forward by economic historians and also because important opportunities for 
cliometric research continually arise from contemporary economic concerns . 
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I. Introduction 
Forty years on from the beginnings of the cliometric school in economic history, 
there is a vast literature that could be reviewed under the general subject area of this 
paper. Inevitably the coverage in this paper must be highly selective. I have chosen 
to emphasize research on big themes , namely, understanding technological change 
and measurement of living standards, which loom larger in economic history than in 
economics generally . These are also areas where the approach and focus of 
economic historians differs in important respects from that of everyday economics. I 
stress, in particular, the important implications of investigating the very long run 
and, before turning to specific issues relating to my chosen themes , consider 
explicitly what is special about research in quantitative economic history compared 
with the applied economics of the present. 
In a review of early work in the field McCloskey correctly asserted that "economic 
theory, especially the theory of price, is the defining skill of cliometricians .. . A 
cliometrician is an economist applying economic theory (usually simple) to historical 
facts (not always quantitative) in the interest of history (not economics) " (1978, p. 
15). This description is in every respect less apposite today than it was twenty years 
ago. Nevertheless , it has continued to be the case that there is often an excellent 
payoff to the straightforward application of techniques encountered in basic training 
in economics and quantitative methods . 
In an earlier survey article, I distinguished five types of contribution that economics 
might make to economic history (Crafts , 1987) . These categories - a) more facts; b) 
better facts ; c) better hypotheses; d) better interpretation of the data; e) better 
historians - are still a useful starting point and can help in the evaluation of some of 
the specific achievements of the cliometric school attempted below. In each of these 
aspects, exemplars related to the key themes of later sections and showing the power 
of relatively elementary economic analysis can readily be found. 
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The most prominent example of 'more facts' is the retrospective use of national 
income accounting on historical data to create estimates of real GDP for a core 
group of OECD economies stretching well back into the nineteenth century. Many 
individual research studies have been synthesized to create a dataset measured in 
purchasing power adjusted dollars of 1990 in the widely used work of Maddison 
(1995). The provision of 'better facts' has been associated especially with addressing 
index number problems better. Here, the biggest single breakthrough came with the 
work of HarJey (1982) who transformed the literature on the British industrial 
revolution by showing that, when appropriate methods of weighting were adopted, 
index numbers of the volume of industrial production indicated that growth in the 
economy as a whole (rather than in a few atypical sectors) had actually been quite 
modest rather than reflecting a take-off as proclaimed by Rostow (1960). 
One of the key skills of the economist in approaching an empirical task lies in 
formulating good hypotheses and using them to decide which pieces of information 
to collect. Fogel has rightly argued that it is "when hypotheses are treated as aids in 
the search for evidence, rather than as substitutes for it, they provide effective 
instruments of research . . . much of what is often called hypothesis testing in 
'scientific' history .. . is really the last step of hypothesis formulation" (1982, p. 106, 
110) . An excellent case in point relates to the celebrated debate from the early days 
of new economic history concerning the extent of 'entrepreneurial failure' in the 
pre-1914 British economy. Use of the basic tools of neoclassical economics cast the 
argument explicitly in terms of profit-maximization and thus highlighted the need to 
consider technical choices in the context of relative factor prices; British 
entrepreneurs were then shown to have been generally, though not always, rational 
in their rejection of American technologies which were unprofitable in British cost 
conditions (Sandberg, 1981). 
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Better interpretation of data typically revolves around specifying ceteris paribus 
conditions where it might be expected that theory can play a valuable role, although 
not without incurring some downside risks. A good illustration of the importance of 
this occurs in the evaluation of comparative growth performance where neoclassical 
analysis will suggest the need to normalize for initial levels of capital intensity and 
total factor productivity and thus for transitory components in the growth process . 
Thus, while the raw data shows that British growth has been slower since the 1970s 
than in the early postwar 'Golden Age', on a normalized basis , performance seems 
to have improved (Bean and Crafts , 1996) . 
The suggestion that use of economics might produce 'better historians' might seem 
both arrogant and misplaced . Much of the following section will, in effect , be 
devoted to seeking to justify this claim, provided that economics is used as an aid to 
historical reasoning rather than to colonize historians ' thought processes . Perhaps 
the simplest yet most powerful examples of this come from the notion of 
'additionality ' which was central to much early work in c1iometrics and which is 
fundamental to neoclassical economics . Thus, in calculating the social savings 
(performing an historical cost-benefit analysis) of nineteenth century American 
railroads, Fogel (1964) destroyed the myth of their indispensability by showing that 
for many purposes water transport was an excellent substitute such that the cost 
reduction attributable to the new technology was quite modest. But quantifying 
additionality requires a specification of the anti-monde; this is natural to economists' 
thinking but alien to many historians' basic training which stresses establishing the 
facts rather than speculating about what might have happened . Highlighting the 
potential - while also promoting greater awareness of the pitfalls - of counterfactual 
historical analysis is one of the most important ways in which better economic 
history can result from sensitive applications of modelling in economic history. 
These illustrations support McCloskey's proposition that much progress in 
c1iometrics has come from the application of quite basic ideas from economics. At 
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the same time, it should be recognized that this generalization cannot bear too much 
weight . This is for two reasons . First, important results have also increasingly come 
from the use of high-powered quantitative methods and econometric techniques . For 
example, the most spectacular addition to the data available for longrun analysis of 
the British economy is the construction of estimates for the English population at 5-
year intervals back to 1541, over 250 years prior to the first census , using highly 
sophisticated, computerized back projection techniques and a sample of parish 
registers (Wrigley and Schofield, 1981). Exploitation of the long runs of data that 
history provides has advanced rapidly as time series econometrics has developed and 
package programmes facilitating methods of analysis not yet developed fifteen years 
ago have become available, as is illustrated by the work of Mills and Crafts (1996) 
on British industrialization. Another important development, where sophisticated 
technique is central and where package programmes have made enormous strides , is 
the use of computable general equilibrium models . This is likely to be of increasing 
importance in analyzing the international economy and has already borne important 
fruit in the area of catch-up and convergence in the pre-1914 world economy 
(O'Rourke and Williamson, 1994, 1995). 
Second, as economics has advanced in its ability to formalize previously intractable 
aspects of the real world, relating for example to economies of scale and imperfect 
competition, the theory which was relied on by early cliometricians may 
increasingly be challenged as both too restrictive and possibly quite misleading, 
particularly for the analysis of major economic events and/or long run implications 
of economic change. This is a central theme of the following section. 
IT. What is Special about Quantitative Economic History? 
Quantitative economic history is rather more than simply the applied economics of 
the past. In part, this is because many of the most interesting problems are attached 
to a well-developed historiography and the audience to be persuaded comprises, in 
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addition to economists, historians who do not necessarily share the same priors . 
Historians are unlikely to be convinced by econometric estimates alone; they require 
assurance of the intuitive reasonableness of regression results and the corroboration 
of other forms of evidence. Applied economists, by contrast, tend to place much 
higher weight than historians on constructing explanations and deriving predictions 
from formal models based on conventional micro economic foundations that allow 
explicit interpretation of estimated coefficients . They would prefer to be precisely 
wrong rather than loosely right and attach relatively little importance to what they 
dismiss as 'anecdotal evidence' . 
Many of the most interesting differences between economic history and applied 
economics have traditionally stemmed from the focus of the former on analysis of 
the long run . At a minimum, this puts a premium on constructing statistical 
databases and understanding the provenance and limitations of data sources. More to 
the point, however, the big issues of economic history have always revolved around 
addressing questions such as 'how did the West grow rich?' which create the need 
for careful measurement of changes in living standards and necessarily place 
technological change centre stage. Three implications of this focus on long-run 
economic development deserve to be noticed. 
First, index number problems loom much larger in economic history than in 
everyday economics. Partly this comes from the sheer magnitude of changes in the 
structure of the economy and the range and quality of goods and services produced 
over several centuries . It is also, however, because economic historians are 
concerned at least as much with discussing living standards as production. This 
implies the need to take account of aspects of well-being that are not captured by 
conventional measures of real wages or real GDP such as changes in leisure, 
longevity and legal status . In turn, this raises obvious questions about how to deal 
with aggregation problems and/or to make imputations to growth rates . 
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Second, it is less obvious that the marginal equivalences of neoclassical economics 
were achieved in the past (McClelland, 1975, p. 125). For example, it has been 
argued in some quarters that, prior to the twentieth century, English labour markets 
were dominated by custom such that money wages .and wage differentials between 
different grades of labour were very inflexible (phelps-Brown, 1977). Perhaps the 
most important illustration of this problem comes from the European demographic 
transition from relatively high 'natural' fertility to much smaller family sizes where 
birth control was widely used. This took place between 1870 and 1940 without 
depending on breakthroughs in contraceptive technology (Watkins , 1986). Watkins 
and other demographers tend to see fertility as essentially unrelated to neoclassical 
optimizing behaviour prior to the twentieth century and there certainly exists no 
satisfactory household economics explanation for the onset of rapid fertility decline. 
Third, in their approach to long run economic development, economic historians 
have always wished to treat more variables as endogenous than would be usual in 
applied economics. For example, the development of well-defmed and enforceable 
property rights has always been regarded as playing an important role in promoting 
the industrial revolution in western Europe and economic historians like North and 
Thomas (1973) have tried to explain differences in property rights by economic 
factors . Even more fundamentally, economic historians have always tended to treat 
innovation and sometimes invention as endogenous even when this was not the case 
in mainstream growth economics . The well-known controversy provoked by the 
claim in Habakkuk (1962) that differences in the rate and bias of technological 
change in nineteenth century Britain and America stemmed from differences in 
factor endowments epitomizes this point. 
In the context of a focus on the very long run in economic history, it is interesting 
explicitly to consider the role of counterfactuals in the cliometric literature. Clearly, 
willingness to entertain counterfactuals is fundamental to weighing the relative 
importance of different explanatory variables . Fishlow (1974) made a useful 
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distinction in this regard between what he called 'latently factual' and 'hypothetical' 
history . Thus, using regression estimates of a demand curve to predict the impact of 
higher cotton prices during the American Civil War on quantity of cotton consumed 
is plainly more reasonable than conjecturing on what the American economy in 1860 
would have looked like had slavery never existed. In the former case, we are 
relatively confident that we can specify an acceptable model that will produce 
unbiased predictions with a small standard error whereas in the latter case we are 
not. 
More generally, it should be recognized that economics does not supply lawlike 
statements for use in economic history. Estimated equations come with error terms 
and the causal relationships that we rely on typically come in the form probably if a 
set of factors then the predicted outcome. When specification of the counterfactual 
involves several of these probabilistic relationships, then our degree of confidence 
will be low. Thus , it tends to be harder to discuss situations where more factors are 
variable - long run general equilibrium results will be less reliable than those based 
on short run partial equilibrium. In some cases, there may be no well-specified 
theory to draw upon. For example, explaining the timing of the first Industrial 
Revolution turns on explaining the arrival of a few spectacular 'macroinventions', 
defined by Mokyr (1993, p. 22) as "those in which a radical new idea ... emerges 
more or less ab nihilo", a task for which even the advent of endogenous innovation 
models leaves us ill-equipped (Crafts, 1995). 
It seems even to be the case that trends in economic analysis are making quasi-
law like statements harder to come by and this may imply that some of the early 
work in new economic history now needs to be revisited. The last twenty years has 
seen the arrival of new industrial economics, new international economics, the new 
economic geography, new growth economics and the much greater use of game 
theory in economics. As a result, old generalizations about the implications of 
industrial concentration for price-cost margins, the superiority of free trade, the 
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unimportance of linkage effects and the independence of longrun growth from the 
investment rate have all been challenged. Game theoretic analyses frequently 
encounter multiple Nash equilibria and in real world cases we cannot rule out the 
possibility that players may well take actions that do not correspond to equilibrium 
play at all (Kreps, 1990, ch. 6) . Some of these developments in economic modelling 
make possible the investigation of economic effects that have long been postulated 
by economic historians but have previously tended to be ignored by economists and 
cliometricians because they were not susceptible of formal treatment. 
An interesting case in point is Fogel 's celebrated study of the impact of the railroad 
in nineteenth century America. He found that the social savings from this transport 
innovation, based on a conventional analysis of the cost reduction for the volume of 
goods actually transported by rail, amounted to 4.7 per cent of GDP in 1890. He 
regarded this as an upper bound measure because a zero price elasticity of demand 
for transport services was employed and, since the upper bound measure was small, 
felt justified in arguing that railways were not vital for American economic growth 
(1964, p.234) . The model was not designed to deal with other important issues such 
as impacts on the spatial location of economic activity, the demand for industrial 
output, induced changes in rates of growth of factor inputs etc. However, since it is 
well known that with perfect competition and constant returns to scale, the standard 
cost-benefit analysis of the social savings captures all the static benefits and since 
with a traditional neoclassical model growth is independent of the savings rate, the 
conventional economics of the 1960s would have justified the limited attention given 
to such matters in the study. Historians expressed some unease that backward and 
forward linkage effects were dismissed rather too quickly (O'Brien, 1977, p. 68, 81) 
but there was no prospect of adequate modelling of such impacts in the 1960s. 
Work in the new economic geography both undermines these assumptions and also 
has progressed to the point where the modelling of linkage effects makes sense and 
is feasible because computable general equilibrium models embracing scale 
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economies and imperfect competition are now available. This means that a wide 
array of indirect impacts on demand and cost conditions in the transport using 
sectors can be encompassed and that it is recognized that direct benefits will be 
understated because price may exceed marginal cost in the transport using sector. 
Venables and Gasiorek (1998) have recently constructed a calibrated model of this 
kind which allows for a more integrated market to reduce price-cost margins, to 
promote exit and entry among fmns and to permit economies of scale and 
agglomeration effects. They find that for freight traffic the ratio of benefits to those 
captured by orthodox cost-benefit analyses may be in the range 1.4 to 1.65 . 
Similarly , research in the new growth economics also suggests that the benefits 
estimate obtained by Fogel may not be an upper bound. Baldwin (1989) considered 
the case of the European Single Market, which might be thought to be analogous to 
a major transport project, and concluded that an endogenous innovation growth 
model would suggest growth rate effects through wider markets that would imply 
that the conventional static benefits estimate should be multiplied by about 5 to 
capture the present value of the dynamic benefits . 
Taking these two points together suggest both that Fogel' s claim that his social 
savings figure is an upper bound may not be correct and that the true social saving 
could be substantially greater than his estimate. This does not mean that the myth of 
indispensability of the railroads should be reinstated nor that the discipline of trying 
to identify additionality should be discarded but it does suggest both that the search 
for evidence of the effects of railways may have been restricted by the priors used 
by many early cliometricians and that the non-railways counterfactual is very 
sensitive to the assumptions used which reflect trends in economic analysis rather 
than lawlike statements. 
Indeed, considering the interest that economic historians have always shown in 
endogenizing technological change and in discussing long run economic change, it is 
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striking that the models used in early cliometric work typically exclude or ignore the 
possibility of induced effects on growth of the kind now widely discussed in new 
growth economics. This is well reflected in the work on the British industrial 
revolution by well-known scholars such as Engerman (1972) on the role of the slave 
trade and Mokyr (1977) on the role of demand and the contributors of the chapters 
in the first edition of the new economic history textbook edited by Floud and 
McCloskey (1981). 
The most striking example of an 'exogenous growth' approach in a major debate in 
economic history is probably the paper by McCloskey (1970) which seeks to deny 
that there was a growth failure in late Victorian Britain despite its being overtaken 
by the United States and rapidly caught up by other rivals while critics alleged that 
British technological performance was very weak (Landes, 1969) . On the contrary, 
argued McCloskey, the British economy "was growing as rapidly as permitted by 
the growth of its resources and the effective exploitation of the available technology" 
(1970, p. 451). These conclusions were based on three very neoclassical arguments 
rather than a thorough perusal of the evidence. First, using a traditional Solow type 
growth model, it was argued that a higher home investment rate would not have 
raised the long run growth rate. Second, the highly competitive market environment 
was seen as precluding entrepreneurial failure . Third, the overall rate of total factor 
productivity (TFP) growth was taken to be exogenously determined. 
While McCloskey's basic conclusions on growth failure may be broadly correct, as 
will be suggested below in section 4, the point to be noted here is the heavy use of a 
priori reasoning (lawlike statements) that is no substitute for a careful review of the 
evidence once an endogenous growth approach is allowed. Thus, it might now be 
argued that TFP growth would reflect the allocation of resources to innovative 
activity and thus be influenced by (broad) capital accumulation strategies and market 
size, that competition and openness have ambiguous effects on innovation and that 
'social capability' will influence the amount of technology transfer rather than 
10 
relying on the universal technology assumption of traditional neoclassical growth 
economics. 
Economic history without counterfactuals , whether implicit or explicit, will be no 
more than tedious description. The use of economic models in economic history 
makes counterfactual reasoning explicit and potentially allows quantification of 
claims of proximate causality and as such can make an enormous contribution to the 
quality of historical analysis. The danger is, however, that the truth of restrictive 
models is assumed and used as a way of dismissing arguments that deserve to be 
taken seriously in an historical context where a rich variety of induced effects may 
operate in the long run. 
3. Living Standards in Economic History 
Both development economists and economic historians have become increasingly 
concerned to develop measures of living standards that are more comprehensive than 
real wages or real GDP per head . Partly, this is because attention has increasingly 
turned to the lives that people lead rather than the incomes that they enjoy and partly 
because in most circumstances a substantial element of well-being is derived not on 
the basis of personal command over resources but depends on provision by the state 
- this tends to be true of health and education in many countries and is universally 
the case for civil and political rights (Dasgupta and Weale, 1992). 
Studies of industrialization, in particular, have underlined to economic historians the 
possibility that there may be circumstances where material prosperity increases 
while other aspects of living standards such as life expectancy deteriorate 
(Engerman, 1997) . It has long been recognized that industrialization in nineteenth 
century conditions, at least for most workers , implied that there was a trade-off 
between higher wages and a worse environment (Williamson, 1990). Moreover, 
research in historical demography has emphasized that over the last century or so 
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changes in life expectancy have been largely independent of those in real incomes 
(preston, 1975) . Although traditionally economic historians have spent much of their 
effort in seeking to quantify real wages, increasingly this is seen as only part of what 
is required . 
If changes in living standards are to be quantified, this is an area where index 
number problems are liable to be acute . Not only is appropriate measurement of the 
cost of living required, which we know from present concerns is difficult as new 
goods proliferate and quality improves over time (Shapiro and Wilcox, 1996), but 
weights have to be developed for the various components of a broad concept of 
economic welfare. In addition, some important aspects of well-being may not lend 
-themselves readily to cardinal measurement. 
What then are the options open to someone who is dissatisfied with conventional 
measures of real incomes in an historical context? Four approaches seem worth 
review, each of which has featured in the recent historical literature - these are 
heights, the Human Development Index (HD!), the Quality of Life Index and 
imputations to GDP growth. While using any of these may be problematic both 
conceptually and in terms of data requirements, it will be argued that that they do 
offer something useful by way of supplementing existing income measures and do 
tend to confirm that real wages and/or real GDP are not the whole story. 
Since the late 1970s one of the most substantial research efforts in c1iometrics has 
been devoted to investigation of human heights in the past. This has involved 
laborious compilation of data especially from military records and the development 
of appropriate statistical methods to deal with the truncated distributions that these 
often report (Wachter and Trussell, 1982) . The potential value of height in the 
context of measuring living standards is that it is known to reflect nutritional status 
and to be sensitive to aspects that are not captured by real wages such as work effort 
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and the disease environment to which a person is exposed (Steckel, 1995). 
Moreover, data on height are sometimes available when the conventional income 
measures are not. 
In fact, there seem to be two different strands of thought about the value of research 
on heights among researchers in the area. At times, height appears to be suggested 
as a good index of welfare per se (e .g., Floud et al. 1990, p. 19) while at other 
times it is proposed as a good diagnostic in a particular historical situation that 
national income or real wages are failing to measure changes in welfare very well 
(e.g ., Steckel, 1992, p.294). Unfortunately, there are serious difficulties in the use 
of heights as a proxy for living standards and the latter appears to be much the more 
defensible position. 
It is essential to remember that attained height is potentially sensitive to relative 
price effects. Changes in relative prices as economic development proceeds and 
moves by the representative agent to a higher indifference curve could easily be 
associated with a fall in height, for example, because the relative price of food had 
increased or real wages had increased in big cities but not in rural districts. While 
information on stature could in principle be used to adjust national accounts concepts 
of income to reflect a broader measure of economic welfare, in practice the 
information requirements are severe and certainly exceed our current knowledge in 
at least two fundamental respects. First, we would need to devise a way of avoiding 
double-counting of the impact on height of expenditures already included in GDP 
and, second, we would need to find a way of quantifying the welfare implications of 
changes in height. More precisely, we would have to be able to estimate willingness 
to pay for non-private income influences on height since height per se is not an 
argument in the utility function (Steckel, 1995, pp. 1917-1919). 
[Insert Table 1] 
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This seems to leave only the second, diagnostic role at present but that may 
nevertheless be important, as Table 1 suggests . Declines in heights during the 
nineteenth century are reported there for several countries . In both the American and 
British cases, it has been suggested that the heights data indicate that economic 
growth and rising real wages are to some extent misleading indicators of changes in 
living standards . Having said this, it is not yet clear what exactly the diagnostic is 
picking up and thus what are the welfare implications. It could be costs of 
urbanization in terms of exposure of workers adverse urban disease environments 
(Floud et al. 1990) or increased inequality of incomes, as regression results obtained 
in Steckel (1983) might imply , or a reduction in food consumption in response to a 
rise in its relative price as argued by Komlos (1995). 
The HDI devised under the auspices of the United Nations is described and reflned 
in successive issues of the Human Deyelopment Report Its focus is the escape from 
poverty and this is seen as depending on public services as well as private incomes . 
HDI is a composite of three basic components : longevity, knowledge and income. 
Human development is seen as a process of expanding people's choices; income is 
assumed to impact on this primarily at low levels of material well-being and, above 
a threshold level, it is considered to make a sharply diminishing contribution 
eventually tailing off to nothing. Longevity, measured by life expectancy at birth 
(eo), and knowledge, measured by a weighted average of literacy (LIT) and school 
enrolment (ENROL), are regarded as central to the enhancement of capabilities but 
are not closely correlated with or strictly dependent on private income. The 
components are combined in a single index by measuring them in terms of the 
distance travelled between the minimum and maximum values ever observed and 
averaging these scores into one index. The precise formula is noted in Table 2. 
HDI has been somewhat controversial but has a wide appeal because of its emphasis 
on a broad concept of well-being including but going beyond income. Economic 
historians have begun to embrace the concept; in the words of Floud and Harris 
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"there is a strong case for using .. . the HDI to investigate the level of human 
welfare in the past" (1997, p. 114) while Costa and Steckel regard HDI as "a 
retrospective index of welfare . .. relevant for understanding the past ... the HDI 
measures how far an economy has come along the path to modem living standards" 
(1997, pp.73-74). Historical estimates of HDI or close approximations to it are 
possible back to the early nineteenth century in some countries and estimates have 
started to appear, some of which are reported in Table 2. 
Nevertheless, the HDI has obvious weaknesses as a measure of economic welfare 
which may not yet be fully appreciated by economic historians . In common with 
heights, the approach runs into difficulties with weighting . It is possible in this case 
to calculate the implicit set of weights that it embodies but when this is done their 
justification is obscure, they vary dramatically at different income levels and are 
quite sensitive to the choice of extreme values. The very low weight given to income 
above an arbitrary threshold level is particularly hard for many commentators to 
accept (Gormely , 1995). Moreover, if the basic rationale of the index stems from a 
concern with capabilities and with the impact of social arrangements, then the 
coverage of HD! might well be regarded as too narrow. Despite these reservations 
about HD!, it may be valuable in historical research. Certainly, comparing today's 
developing countries with their European predecessors on the basis of HD! gives a 
quite different impression from that which is obtained using national accounts, as is 
reflected in the estimates for India and Italy in Table 2. 
[Insert Table 2] 
Indeed the results contained in Table 2 underline at least one important message. It 
is clear that any index of living standards giving a substantial weight to life 
expectancy will make the developing countries of the recent past look much better 
compared with the leading countries of 1870 than does a comparison based simply 
on real GDP/head. Moreover, since it is generally agreed that the majority of 
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improvements in mortality experience have resulted from 'exogenous ' factors such 
as advances in science and public health programmes, it is also likely that growth of 
living standards since 1870 as measured by real national income per head is a 
substantial underestimate. To confirm this , however, we would need a way to value 
the exogenous change in life expectancy in terms of income and the HDI 
methodology does not provide a way to carry this out. 
Dasgupta and Weale (1992) stress that the HDI ignores other important aspects of 
well-being which depend on state provision rather than private income. In particular, 
they argue for the inclusion of civil and political rights in a more comprehensive 
Quality of Life Index. This raises two formidable problems : how to measure rights 
and how to incorporate them in an index with other components of welfare. 
Dasgupta and Weale, looking at evidence from the post 1970 period, proceeded as 
follows. They used a ranking scale of 1 to 7 to measure rights based on the survey 
data published in Taylor and Jodice (1983) which adopted a concept of civil rights 
based on freedom of the press and independence of the judiciary and a concept of 
political rights based on political liberty and the ability to vote governments out of 
office in free and fair elections. Political and civil rights are two of the six 
components in the Quality of Life index, the others being income per head, adult 
literacy, life expectancy and infant mortality . Dasgupta and Weale's solution to the 
index number problem was to use ordinal aggregation based on the Borda Rule . In 
other words, each observation was ranked on each criterion and these ranks were 
then summed to find the Borda score. 
An ordinal approach of this kind has many merits and deserves serious consideration 
by economic historians in future . In principle, it is very flexible and other arguments 
can be included or weighting schemes introduced within the aggregation procedure. 
This weakens somewhat the criticisms that might be made of the inclusion of the 
rights measures, namely, that they are ethnocentric and subjective judgements would 
be needed to generate similar rankings for earlier periods. Nevertheless, if this index 
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is claimed to have general applicability, then the most promising justification is on 
the grounds that certain 'prudential ' values comprise a core set that is shared by all 
persons and, if so, it is not clear that this list of six aspects is acceptable (Qizilbash, 
1997). For those who dislike the equal weights embodied in the basic Borda Rule, 
Qizilbash suggests two options. Either to look for Pareto Dominance or to 
experiment with weights while retaining all the arguments and see whether overall 
rankings are sensitive to weighting (intersection Borda ranking). Unfortunately , it 
seems likely that in the most interesting cases , where historians will disagree, these 
procedures are unlikely to resolve the argument. 
None of the three methodologies discussed so far allows for conventional economic 
growth rates to be adjusted to accommodate a broader concept of the standard of 
living, although this has been attempted in the past, most notably by Nordhaus and 
Tobin (1 972). Usher (1980, ch. 7) provides a detailed rationale for making 
imputations to growth rates for environmental changes, i.e., for variables that 
contribute to welfare, are not counted directly or indirectly as part of income and 
where the average amount enjoyed is changing over time. He argues that in these 
cases it is only the value of changes to consumption that should be taken into 
account. Usher takes pollution, crime, life expectancy and leisure to be potentially 
important examples. All are clearly relevant to a long run view of living standards 
and probably should eventually be addressed by economic historians but only the last 
two have been quantified thus far . Even in these cases the results are no more than 
preliminary and the assumptions/data requirements are rather demanding. 
The adjustment to real GDP growth suggested by Usher (1980) for changes in 
mortality is as follows 
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tlQIQ tl YIY + (LlliIE)/~ (1 ) 
where Q is GDP adjusted for mortality changes, E is an age-structure weighted , 
average of discounted life expectancies and ~ is the elasticity of annual utility with 
respect to annual consumption. In this formula an increase in mortality is treated as 
a completely exogenous change in the consumers' environment which cannot be 
bought but for which a price would willingly be paid. A more general formulation 
suggested by Williamson (1984) for use in historical circumstances where, for 
example, nutritional improvements may be part of the story is 
tlQIQ tl Y IY + (ztlE/E)/~ (2) 
where z is the proportion of mortality change taken to be exogenous . It is not easy to 
find firm historical evidence on appropriate values of the discount rate, z and ~ , 
although for late nineteenth century Europe values around 5 per cent, 0.75 and 0.25 
respectively may be about right (Crafts, 1997a) . Williamson's formula is used to 
produce the imputations for mortality reported in Table 3. 
Nordhaus and Tobin (1972) found that their attempt to estimate the long run rate of 
growth of 'Measurable Economic Welfare ' (MEW) for the United States was totally 
dominated by adjustments for leisure/non-market work time. This is noteworthy for 
three reasons. First, leisure has been ignored in all the recent work on living 
standards. Second, how best to handle time use in measuring living standards is 
highly controversial; while Usher (1980) argued that it is best treated as an 
environmental variable, he recognized that others might prefer to see it as a regular 
commodity, in which case the total value of hours not spent in market work needs to 
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be added to income. The environmental assumption valuing changes tends to raise 
measure growth rates for OECD countries while the commodity assumption tends to 
do the opposite unless leisure time is assumed to have increasing productivity . 
Third, an assumption needs to be made as to whether there is technological progress 
in the enjoyment of leisure and/or performance of non-market work . 
Given these difficulties, it is perhaps not surprising that most economists have 
chosen to avoid the issue . For economic historians , however, this does not seem to 
be acceptable because, as Nordhaus and Tobin (1972) discovered , changes in market 
work time over the long run have been very large indeed . Maddison (1995) suggests 
that average hours worked per person employed per year in OECD countries were 
close to 3000 in 1870 whereas in recent years they have been little more than half 
that. Changes in age strucrure and labour force participation rates over time have 
also been pronounced but a fairly similar proportionate change has occurred in hours 
worked per member of the population. The potential imputation to conventionally 
measured growth is clearly large, as Table 3 shows, where the imputation is on the 
basis of valuing changes in market work time at the average wage rate in the 
terminal year and adding this amount to end year GDP and assuming no 
technological progress in time use. 
[Insert Table 3] 
Obviously, the calculations in Table 3 are at best crude approximations and they rely 
on some strong assumptions. The main point that they make is simply that 
imputations along these lines tend to be rather large and suggest that conventional 
GDP growth rates understate the rate of improvement of average living standards for 
reasons that would be familiar to devotees of both the HDI and the MEW. Indeed, 
since the estimates rely on a rather conservative assumption of zero productivity 
growth in non-market work time, these imputations may well be rather too low. 
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A good way to pull together some of the points made in this section is to ask what 
difference it might make to take these various ideas from economics and apply them 
to the classic debate on the standard of living of the working classes during the 
British industrial revolution. This is a controversy that has already had a substantial 
input from cliometrics which has significantly improved both the database about 
which arguments can be made and also the economic development context in which 
different strands of the debate should be understood. 
Much of the effort from cliometricians has gone into improving conventional 
estimates of real wages and national income growth during the industrial revolution. 
In each case, better index numbers have been the key contribution. In the case of 
macroeconomic growth, the most important development has been the production of 
improved weightings for industrial production (Crafts and Harley, 1992) . For real 
wages a great deal of effort has gone into the production of better cost of living 
indices (Lindert and Williamson, 1983; Crafts and Mills, 1994; Feinstein, 1995) . In 
addition, diligent analysis of budget studies has also produced a good deal more 
information on earnings of family members other than male heads of household 
(Horrell and Humphries, 1992). 
There are too many data problems to reach complete agreement and existing cost of 
living indices, while much better designed, still offer quite a wide range of 
estimates . It is agreed that real wage growth was slow, especially before 1820 and 
that by 1850 there are clear signs of an improvement in average real wages 
compared with 1780. In turn, the context for this is now generally accepted to be 
that the acceleration of economic growth during the industrial revolution was more 
modest than previous estimates had suggested and that growth of real output per 
head was very slow at least until the 1820s in the face of demographic pressure. The 
general tendency of this debate has been that, for the average worker, any gains in 
living standards before 1820 are very doubtful but between 1820 and 1850 there are 
unambiguous signs of improvement (Lindert, 1994) . 
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[Insert Table 4] 
What difference would it make to approach the controversy with the broader indices 
of living standards discussed above? Table 4 sets out evidence on trends in 
components of well-being and reports some of the new index numbers. The central 
feature of Table 4, which underlines why the episode has been controversial, is the 
disparate movement of the various components of living standards. For example, in 
the early years, while growth in income is at best very modest, life expectancy 
improves but civil rights deteriorate. After 1830, income grew more quickly and 
civil rights improve markedly but mortality conditions worsen . 
Turning to the indices , the weights of the HDI would summarize the evidence in 
more optimistic terms than confining attention to real wages . This conclusion holds, 
although less strongly, for variants of the HDI that have been suggested in the 
Human Development Report , namely the GDI (the gender-related development 
index), which takes account of disparities between men and women and employs a 
gender inequality aversion coefficient, and the DAHDI (the distribution adjusted 
HDI) in which the income variable is mUltiplied by (1 - Gini) . The Dasgupta and 
Weale Quality of Life Index also exhibits steady improvement with each year 
showing an improvement in rank. While it has often been supposed that looking at 
the overall quality of life would be more supportive of pessimistic views on living 
standards than confining attention to real wages, these results reject that view. 
An investigator who used heights as an index of welfare would come to a very 
different conclusion, namely that there was a period of falling living standards and 
that it came when real wages at last showed definite gains, between 1830 and 1850, 
at a time when the improvement in life expectancy was checked. One reaction to this 
conflict between heights and the HDI or Quality of Life indices would be to say that 
this underlines the unsuitability of heights as an index of living standards and to 
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consider it as a diagnostic, perhaps on the basis of a detailed look at disaggregated 
patterns of changes in heights. 
Further analysis of the components of the Quality of Life index shows that there is 
some evidence of Pareto Dominance such that 1850 dominates 1760 and 1780 and 
that 1830 dominates 1760, 1780 and 1820. Experiments with alternative weighting 
schemes found that, on intersection Borda ranking, 1830 is superior to 1800, 1850 is 
superior to 1820 and 1820 is superior to 1760. Any judgement on 1830 compared 
with 1850 turns out to be very sensitive to the weights given to infant mortality and 
life expectancy. 
The detailed evidence presented by Floud et al. (1990) established that the decline in 
heights is an urban phenomenon intensified by the rapid urbanization of the 
economy. Recent research has also suggested that during the second quarter of the 
nineteenth century, mortality in big British cities deteriorated (Szreter and Mooney, 
1998), and in turn the solution to this problem seems to have awaited adequate 
public health interventions and supply of local public goods (Szreter, 1997). Heights 
and the detailed analysis of the Quality of Life index both seem to argue that Britain 
was characterized by a market failure of the kind highlighted by the capabilities 
approach but overlooked in computations of real wages and also to suggest that the 
optimistic assessment of living standards in the second quarter of the nineteenth 
century needs reconsideration. 
It may, however, not be appropriate to stop here without further quantification. 
Williamson (1990) has strenuously argued on the basis of econometric analysis of 
wage variations across towns that the wage gains made by urban workers far 
outweighed the disamenities payments that they required to accept worse 
environmental conditions. Using the imputations approach to consider the impact of 
changing mortality, modest additions to GDP growth of around 0.2 per cent per year 
would apply during 1760 to 1830 with a subtraction of a similar amount per year 
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during 1830 -50, a result that tends to support Williamson's inference that there 
were net living standards gains in that period. 
Once again, it is also worth remarking that changes in time use appear to be the 
forgotten aspect of standards of living in the industrial revolution as well as more 
recently. Here the evidence is still very thin but some progress has been made using 
court records to establish changing patterns of daily behaviour. A tentative result 
from this work is that the early stages of the industrial revolution through to the 
beginnings of the nineteenth century may have seen quite a big increase in average 
hours of market work per worker per year. Voth (1998) estimates that London area 
workers averaged 2631 hours in 1760 but 3366 in 1800. An imputation for this, 
using Usher's methodology as before, might subtract about 0.3 per cent per year 
from growth during 1760-1800. 
Overall, the main outcomes of this exercise are first to show that it is possible to use 
the new tools for measurement of living standards to illuminate a classic historical 
debate, second, to emphasize the value of going beyond real wages in assessing the 
contribution of the industrial revolution to the quality of life, and thirdly, to 
demonstrate that the existing textbook summaries of the state of play need 
considerable qualification. On the other hand, it certainly should not be claimed that 
this additional quantification has resolved the debate. 
4. Catch-Up, Convergence and All That 
In the early days of the new economic history the principal tools for the formal 
analysis of growth were the Solow growth model, the aggregate, well-behaved 
production function and growth accounting based on these concepts . This provided, 
and still provides, useful discipline and helpful benchmarks for the historical 
understanding of growth around the basic relationship: 
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tJ.Y/Y atJ.K/K + ptJ.L/L + TFPgrowth (3) 
where a + p = 1. In particular, the insights that this model provides based on 
diminishing returns to accumulating more and more identical capital, that growth in 
the long run is independent of the investment rate, that growth will tend to be 
inversely related to the initial level of capital (and income) per worker and to exhibit 
catch-up through reductions in factor intensity gaps between countries, and that 
many aspects of institutions or economic policy thought by the general public to 
affect growth may only have levels effects, are valuable . 
'Nevertheless, the traditional neoclassical model plainly also has severe limitations , 
especially for explaining long run growth. Two of the most obvious are the failure 
to distinguish human capital as a separate factor of production and the treatment of 
TFP growth as exogenous. Two slightly less obvious are the temptation to identify 
the Solow residual with technological change and the implied treatment of catch-up 
and overtaking that are embodied in the model. 
A response to one of these criticisms was to switch to the Augmented-Solow model 
which adds human capital to the factors of production while retaining the well-
behaved production function and exogenous TFP growth. thus equation (3) becomes: 
tJ.Y/Y atJ.K/K + PtJ.L/L + ytJ.H/H + TFP growth (4) 
where H is human capital and (a + P + y = 1) . Given that in equilibrium H/K will 
be a constant ratio, the Augmented Solow model has broadly similar properties to 
the Solow model provided (a + y) < 1 but transitional convergence to the steady 
state will be more gradual. This model with common technology in all countries has 
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been argued to provide a good explanation of income levels in international cross-
sections and an acceptable way to account for recent growth experience (Mankiw et 
al. 1992) and it lies behind the more sophisticated analysis of conditional 
convergence in Barro (1997) . Nevertheless , a closer look at the data even for the 
OECD countries suggests that a number of implications of the Augmented-Solow 
model are invalid and this should restrain economic historians' enthusiasm for it. 
First, tests based on time-series econometric methods have rejected both the strong 
form of convergence that long term forecasts of differences in output per person for 
OECD countries tend to zero and also the weaker version that long run forecasts of 
output per person are proportional with a single long term trend for all advanced 
countries (Bernard and Durlauf, 1995; Mills and Crafts, 1999) . Second, Prescott 
(1998) concluded after a lengthy review of the evidence that the neoclassical growth 
model with or without human capital cannot explain international income differences 
which are so large that the hypothesis of common TFP across countries must be 
rejected. Similarly, Islam (1995) re-examined the Mankiw et al (1992) results using 
a panel data approach and found that country specific differences in TFP were 
substantial. None of this will be surprising to economic historians like Clark (1987) 
who found huge productivity differences in cotton textiles across countries on the 
eve of World War I long after the technology used in the industry had become 
generally and well-known. 
Third , Milbourne (1995) estimated the following regression for eighteen OECD 
countries in 1960-1985 : 
which is derived from the Augmented Solow model where y is income per worker, 
Sk and Sh are the physical and human capital savings rates, n is population growth, g 
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is the rate of technological progress, 0 is the depreciation rate and A is the level of 
technology. If the Augmented-Solow specification is correct, then (/\.1 + ~) = O. 
This restriction is easily rejected. This implies that the initial level of TFP affects 
subsequent income growth rather than simply the initial factor intensities . Thus , 
contraction of labour productivity gaps between leaders and followers in OEeD 
growth has involved not only reducing the factor shortfalls in human and physical 
capital per worker, as envisaged by the Augmented-Solow model , but also reducing 
TFP gaps . Indeed, Milbourne's estimates suggest that these two aspects of catch-up 
growth were of a similar magnitude. 
The most influential economic historian writing on the topic of catch-up in economic 
growth attributes the variability of experience and TFP performance that is not 
readily captured by the Augmented Solow model to 'social capability ' (Abramovitz, 
1986). This is not tightly defined but a number of important ingredients are 
indicated. The basic idea is that countries differ in their ability effectively to 
assimilate technology . A major step forward in the analysis of the historical 
experience of growth would come if this notion could be pinned down more 
precisely and quantified . 
One aspect of 'social capability ' that can be identified is human capital , not as a 
factor of production, but as a determinant of the speed and completeness of 
technological catch-up in follower countries . This formulation is in fact supported by 
the econometric results in Benhabib and Spiegel (1994) and Islam (1995). Social 
capability clearly involves much more than education, however, and Abramovitz 
himself stressed the role of institutions and the incentive structures to which they 
give rise. At one level, this involves the prevalence of rent-seeking and the ability of 
vested interests to thwart modernization of the economy rather as argued by Prescott 
(1998) . More fundamentally , the appropriation of profits is central to efforts to 
reduce costs through innovation and technology transfer. A key requirement is that 
26 
transactions costs are kept reasonably low and that entrepreneurs are not deterred 
from investing in fixed costs by opportunism and 'hold-up' problems. 
In accounting for long run growth we need to acknowledge the role of technological 
change and, in general, would wish to endogenize TFP growth rather than leave it 
as exogenous or seek to suppress it as in some recent endogenous growth models . 
Economic historians generally will be supportive of Romer in his suggestion that 
ideas gaps matter as well as object gaps in explaining income differences across 
countries and will applaud his statement that "our knowledge of economic history, 
of what production looked like 100 years ago, and of current events convinces us 
beyond any doubt that discovery, invention and innovation are of overwhelming 
importance in economic growth ... We could produce statistical evidence suggesting 
that all growth came from capital accumulation with no room for anything called 
technological change. But we would not believe it." (Romer, 1993, p. 562) 
Perhaps then, economic historians will fmd more use for the recent endogenous 
innovation models of growth set out in Grossman and Helpman (1991) or Aghion 
and Howitt (1997) which might be said to have quite close links with the idea of 
social capability. In essence, this approach accepts the insights of the neoclassical 
growth model with regard to the relationship between physical capital and growth 
and, as with equation (3), predicts that in the long run growth rate will be 
proportional to TFP growth. The difference lies in the model's prediction that TFP 
growth will depend on the resources used in innovative activity which depends in 
turn on the expected ability to appropriate profits from innovation. In the Grossman-
Helpman model, innovation and growth depend positively on the size of the market, 
the productivity of labour in research, and the degree of market power. In Aghion 
and Howitt, imperfect competition is central to profit-motivated innovation but 
monopoly is expected to be bad for growth because it encourages managers to enjoy 
a quiet life. 
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The central insight of the endogenous innovation models that is valuable for 
economic historians is that expected profitability of innovative activity can influence 
the long run growth rate . There is plenty of evidence in the technology literature to 
support the centrality of the appropriability of returns to innovative effort and the 
role of market size in supporting R & D (Jaffe, 1988) but the detailed assumptions 
in the early endogenous innovation literature, for example with regard to the 
importance of monopoly power and patents are not supported . Lead times over 
rivals seem in most cases to be the key imperfection in competition (Levin et al. 
1987) and, in line with Aghion and Howitt, rivalry among big firms seems to be 
helpful in stimulating R & D (Patel and Pavitt, 1992). 
Taking a wider view of the appropriability problem, it is clear that 'hold-up ' 
problems will potentially inhibit innovative effort and, thus, growth. This opens up a 
link to a wide array of arguments about growth familiar from the historical 
literature, for example in relation to the role of property rights and strong but 
limited government (Weingast, 1995). Many institutional arrangements might 
influence the seriousness of hold-up problems . For example, an illustration relating 
to industrial relations can be found in Bean and Crafts (1996), where it is argued 
that multiple unionism in postwar British industry inhibited productivity 
improvement because neither reputation not contractual mechanisms could commit 
workers not to expropriate innovators ex post. In sum, it is probably the spirit rather 
than the letter of these new growth models that should be taken on board by 
economic historians and which might be useful in exploring social capability more 
deeply . 
Catching-up is not automatic and history suggests that absence of social capability 
may be a crucial obstacle to growth and development. Gerschenkron (1962) 
provided a famous discussion of the opportunities and difficulties of 'economic 
backwardness' of which modern economics can help make more sense. Insights 
from Gerschenkron's analysis may still be helpful in understanding both why 
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institutions and sources of growth differ in later developers and the difficulties 
which may emerge following a period of rapid catch-up while substantial 
productivity gaps still remain. 
Gerschenkron suggested that backward countries could achieve a take-off into very 
rapid growth if they could substitute for 'missing prerequisities', in particular a lack 
of 'entrepreneurship' . Gerschenkron's arguments can be restated as proposing that 
institutional innovations to establish larger vertically integrated enterprises, to 
develop investment banking, to provide strong cash flows for incumbent producers 
and to allow a strong role for the state in the aUocation of investment offer a route to 
rapid catch-up growth. This might be regarded as very much the same thing as 
establishing social capability through reducing transactions costs and problems 
arising from asymmetric information plus solving co-ordination problems. 
It follows that, in Gerschenkron' s view, the optimal boundaries of the firm, methods 
of corporate governance and design of capital markets may vary at different stages 
of development as may the priority given to mobilizing savings as opposed to 
achieving an optimal allocation of resources. If this is so, a distinct possibility is 
that, at some point, the original institutional arrangements become sub-optimal or 
even dysfunctional but hard to modernize . For example, at some stage, more 
orthodox Western fmancial systems may become superior but, where bankers and 
regulators lack the relevant human capital and resources, switching may be fraught 
with problems of moral hazard . Alternatively , interest groups may be able 
successfully to lobby against change. It is important to recognize that neither 
Gerschenkron's arguments nor the conditions under which the proposed 
development trajectory would be able to resist rent-seeking or crony capitalism and 
be capable eventually of efficient metamorphosis have yet been given solid 
microconomic foundations, although developments in economic theory since he 
wrote suggest that this might be possible. 
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These issues have new salience in the context of recent East Asian economic history. 
Strategies to achieve rapid growth bear a strong resemblance to Gerschenkron's 
recipe. Rodrik (1995) provides an account of the policies of Korea and Taiwan for 
mobilizing investment that matches the above description fairly closely. Moreover, 
the well-known 'getting relative prices wrong' and 'governed markets' approaches 
of, respectively, Amsden (1989) and Wade (1990) to explaining fast growth in these 
countries can also be seen as having very strong similarities. The recent frnancial 
crises bear strong witness to the downside risks of frnancial liberalization despite the 
clear need to reform later on in the development process (Miller and Luangaram, 
1998). 
The main attempts to quantify these institutional aspects of social capability have 
come in recent work in the international cross-section growth regressions literature . 
Prominent examples of this work can be found in Barro (1997), Knack and Keefer 
(1995) and Mauro (1995) . Each of these studies adds to a conventional cross section 
regression a variable that seeks to measure, respectively, the applicability of the rule 
of law, the security of property rights and contract enforcement, and the extent of 
corruption. In each case, large and significant effects are found which imply that 
low institutional quality is a serious drag on growth. The variables themselves are 
taken from survey evidence on country risks collected by agencies publishing 
information to inform investors . The implications of these 'second generation ' 
growth regressions are that catch-up growth prospects are much less strong in 
countries like those of the former Soviet Union than would be supposed on the basis 
of looking just at their endowments of human capital and the large initial 
productivity gap (EBRD, 1997) . 
This suggests that the economic historians' preoccupation with social capability and 
warnings that catch-up is not automatic are probably justified but the work thus far 
may not adequately address the question of measurement, especially since the 
variables derived from the survey evidence have a fairly tenuous connection with the 
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appropriation and transactions costs issues that lie at the heart of the new growth 
economics . For example, it is noticeable that both Italy and Korea score quite badly 
on several of these indicators and might in many ways be regarded as 'corrupt', yet, 
as Gerschenkron might have predicted, they have found ways to prevent 
opportunism undermining economic growth. Moreover, these data are only available 
for the recent past. Although there has been some welcome progress, therefore, 
quantification of social capability remains to be satisfactorily achieved. 
Despite the advent of growth regressions, the single most important quantitative tool 
available for the historical analysis of growth remains growth accounting, at bottom 
using applications of equation (3). Its results should be seen more as benchmarks 
and explicanda than literal truths but nevertheless it provides an important 
quantitative framework for thinking about growth and is an important safeguard 
against explanations of growth based on wishful thinking and ahistorical theorizing 
especially those that are hyperbolic on the importance of technological revolutions . 
Thus, growth accounting estimates of TFP growth during the industrial revolutions 
in Britain (Crafts, 1995) and the United States (Abramovitz, and David, 1998) 
suggest only a modest contribution to growth throughout the nineteenth century. 
Care is needed, however, in interpreting the results from growth accounting. It is 
important to recognize that the TFP estimates that it produces do not translate 
directly into estimates of the rate of technological change. A glance at Maddison 
(1996, p. 59) underlines this point as he offers a breakdown of TFP growth since 
1950 in six OECD countries which distinguishes a foreign trade effect, a structural 
change effect, an economies of scale effect and a catch-up effect together with an 
unexplained component. The first three of these should probably be regarded as 
improvements in the allocation of resources rather than technological change. 
Maddison's estimates are ad hoc, however, and it would be nice to approach the 
historical decomposition of TFP growth more formally. The work of Morrison 
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(1993) provides a rigorous methodology for doing this which allows for the 
distorting effects of market power, scale economies and quasi-fixed factors/capacity 
utilization on conventional Solow residuals and then permits the estimation of 'true' 
technological change. Unfortunately, the data requirements for this technique are 
quite severe but it has been applied to Italy by Rossi and Toniolo (1991) (1996). 
They found that the component of Italian TFP growth attributable to technological 
change was only 0.1 out of 0.8 per cent per year in 1895-1939 and 0.5 per cent out 
of 3.0 per cent per year in 1950-90. 
Another source of bias which will usually pull in the other direction and may be 
substantial has been stressed by Rodrik (1997), namely that TFP growth estimates 
from conventional growth accounting implicitly rely on the assumption either that 
technological change is neutral or that the elasticity of substitution between factors 
of production is one. Both these assumptions are probably false . In this case, 
however, we are unlikely to be able to quantify the bias accurately although we do 
know that it is more serious the faster is the rate of growth of capital inputs relative 
to labour inputs , which will typically occur during periods of rapid catch-up growth. 
[Insert Table 5] 
The most obvious example of the continued value of growth accounting is provided 
by recent work on growth in East Asia . Table 5 reports what are probably the best 
set of estimates for that region compiled on a comparable basis by Collins and 
Bosworth (1996). Their work is fairly representative, although difficulties of the 
data mean that further revisions may well emerge. For example, it is likely that 
Singaporean TFP growth is underestimated because of measurement errors relating 
to the capital stock and China's overestimated through output growth measurement 
errors. Table 5 also displays similar estimates for the fast catch-up phase of growth 
in Japan and some Western European countries which provide an interesting 
comparison. 
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Contrary to earlier beliefs, the general point made by writers considering estimates 
like those of Table 5 is that East Asian growth has resulted much more from capital 
accumulation, based both on high savings rates and low capital to output ratios, than 
from productivity growth. To this should also be added the substantial contribution 
of demographic factors working through age structure changes leading to fast 
growth of labour inputs per person. This is a pronounced difference from Europe 
where the demographic transition long preceded the Golden Age. Together the 
Asian capital and labour contributions really do seem to dwarf those in their 
European counterparts whereas the fast growth of TFP in Europe, and also in early 
postwar Japan, makes recent Asian achievements somewhat disappointing. 
The impression given by these estimates is that development strategies for escape 
from backwardness in East Asia were actually better at mobilizing resources than 
achieving rapid TFP growth which might well be what Gerschenkron would have 
predicted. In comparative perspective, that seems unlikely to be undermined by 
Rodrik's arguments on bias since capital deepening was even more pronounced in 
Golden Age Europe. Given the strong role probably played by factors other than 
technological progress in Europe's rapid TFP growth, it WOUld, however, be wrong 
at this point to suggest that East Asia has been a failure at innovation per se, given 
both that institutional arrangements in the leading countries have been much praised 
for their success in encouraging technology transfer (Bell and Pavitt, 1993) and also 
that distortions in the allocation of investment funds appear likely to be a significant 
factor in retarding productivity growth (Lee, 1995; Smith, 1995). What is clearly 
needed is some quantitative analysis aimed at decomposition of TFP growth over 
time in different countries, techniques for which are now available, as was noted 
earlier. 
[Insert Table 6] 
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An obvious reaction to the growth accounting results is to be sceptical of them on 
the grounds that, until the recent flllancial crises, East Asian countries seemed to 
outperform their European rivals even including the leading countries that had 
already matched European income levels . Some sort of reality check seems to be 
required especially to persuade both historians and economists who dislike the 
specifcation of the production function on which the estimates rely . Table 6 offers 
some help and at the same time underlines the importance of theory in selecting 
appropriate comparisons from the data. 
If productivity is the focus of attention in catch-up growth, then comparisons should 
be made in those terms rather than proxies such as GDP per person. The estimates 
in Table 6 indicate that, although East Asian countries have caught up Western 
Europe in terms of income per person, there is still a sizeable labour productivity 
gap. A greater proportion of people are in the working age groups in Asian 
countries and hours worked per year are typically a good deal longer than in 
Western Europe (Crafts, 1998a). Given that it seems clear that Asian capital per 
worker is higher relative to Europe than is output per worker, then the explanation 
for this remaining productivity gap must to a large extent result from lower TFP in 
Asia and there is still considerable scope for TFP catch-up, at which leading Asian 
countries may be improving (Collins and Bosworth, 1996). Thus, the paradox of fast 
growth at high income levels is resolved when productivity performance is analyzed 
in detail. 
[Insert Table 7] 
Growth accounting is an ingredient but does not of itself supply all the benchmarks 
that evaluation of comparative growth performance requires. We need some way to 
judge whether a country exceeded what might have been expected given its starting 
point. This clearly requires econometric modelling and there is no agreed way to do 
this but the economics literature offers some possibilities. Table 7 offers one simple 
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exercise based on the work of Benhabib and Spiegel (1994) . Their research implies 
that the TFP growth rate that might be expected during catching-up depends on the 
standard of education and the initial productivity gap and their regressions give an 
estimate of the magnitude. Based on this estimate, it appears that Golden Age 
Europe had unexpectedly rapid TFP growth while the opposite was true during 
Asia's recent catch-up. This adds weight to the suggestion that Asian countries have 
been better at mobilizing factor inputs and acquiring technology than in using 
resources efficiently but plainly needs supplementing by more sophisticated 
analyses. 
Although there may be many reasons to argue about the detail of these growth 
accounting exercises and their extensions, nevertheless in sum they provide a strong 
antidote to many of the myths about Asian growth that are frequently believed. 
Similar value can often be had in economic history as has been confirmed by the 
long run studies of British and American economic growth of Matthews et al. (1983) 
and Abramovitz and David (1998). 
Rather less explicit attention has been paid to overtaking by the new growth 
economics than to catch-up and convergence. This is unfortunate for economic 
historians because the long run growth process clearly has involved changing 
leadership, most famously at the point where the United States decisively overtook 
Britain in terms of real GDP per person and also became the world's undisputed 
technological leader at the end of the nineteenth century. By 1929, American real 
GDP per person was 13l.4 per cent of the British level having been only 75.3 per 
cent in 1870 (Maddison, 1995) . Again, Solow models leave something to be desired 
here. With common technology, savings rates and population growth we will see 
convergence but not overtaking and the historical experience in question clearly 
involves more than just differences in steady state income levels based on factor 
intensities, although ultimately the much higher level of natural resources per head 
in America does seem to have mattered. 
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[Insert Table 8] 
Endogenous growth theory certainly envisages the possibility of divergence and 
overtaking more readily than did traditional neoclassical theory. This is especially 
true if technological spillovers between countries are rather weak, a situation that 
seems more likely to have prevailed a century ago than now (Nelson and Wright, 
1992), and either social capability or learning experiences differ across countries . In 
fact, explicit discussions of overtaking or leapfrogging tend to have been built on 
learning and can be thought of as modern versions of the dynamic consequences of 
comparative advantage. In this regard, it is striking that Table 8 reports huge 
differences in revealed comparative advantage in the US and the UK at the time 
when leadership changed. Broadly speaking American comparative advantage 
centred on sectors that were natural resource intensive and/or research intensive 
while British comparative advantage seems to have been based more on the expertise 
built up during the industrial revolution (Crafts, 1989; Wright, 1990). 
The original learning models linking endogenous growth to comparative advantage 
were put forward in Krugman (1987) and Lucas (1988) . Here sectorally specific 
learning which augments domestic human capital with no international spillovers 
potentially delivers both different long-run growth rates and reinforces the initial 
comparative advantage. An extension to provide leapfrogging in a Ricardian trade 
model is provided in Brezis et al. (1993) which can result in leapfrogging if the 
factor price incentives in the follower country encourage earlier adoption of and 
greater learning in a new technology with higher long run productivity potential. 
Lucas (1993) offers a different extension by exploring a situation where leadership 
can be sustained indefinitely but only if, through a succession of technologies, 
learning advantages spill over to new rapid learning sectors . 
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These models and more mainstream endogenous innovation growth economics both 
have insights to offer that were absent from the early new economic history 
discussion of alleged Victorian failure and, in fact, may help to account for the 
emergence of much faster TFP growth in the United States after the turn of the 
century (Abramovitz and David, 1998) which fits rather uneasily with McCloskey's 
(1970) exoneration of British growth performance. Indeed, it might be the case that 
the case that Victorian Britain did not fail will ultimately rest on aspects that are 
excluded from traditional neoclassical growth models . 
Mutatis mutandis, the learning models might be used to formalize the messages 
coming from research which has reformulated the Habakkuk hypothesis that 
American technological leadership stemmed from its factor endowments. 
Econometric research has established conclusively that technological change in 
American manufacturing was pervasively materials and capital-using and labour 
saving after 1850 (Cain and Paterson, 1986) and this in turn seems to have relied 
heavily on learning processes shaped by technical choices th.at responded both to 
cheap natural resources and a large and relatively homogeneous market, conditions 
that were not found in Europe at that time (Nelson and Wright, 1992) . By the early 
twentieth century, the acceleration in American growth that moved the country 
decisively ahead of Britain can be explained at least in part by arguments familiar 
from endogenous innovation. Thus, the domestic market is far larger than that of 
Britain, American corporations have larger production runs, research labour is 
relatively cheaper and better trained than in Britain (Crafts, 1998b). 
Nevertheless, the historical experience is much richer than either of these research 
streams can yet encompass. Williamson (1996) has pointed to the central role of 
factor migration in American economic growth as both labour and capital chased 
American natural resources. David and Wright (1997) have stressed both the 
importance of social capability in terms of effective property rights and the crucial 
role of feedbacks and increasing returns that eventually led to American resource 
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abundance, rather than rapid resource depletion, through learning, discovery and 
induced human capital formation. Thus, both the size of the market and the natural 
resource endowments that distinguish America from Britain in the early twentieth 
century were endogenous rather than exogenous. On top of this, the greater size and 
standardization of the American market provoked important institutional innovations 
that facilitated the use of new technologies . For example, American employers had 
far greater incentives to undermine trade unionism and craft control in many 
industries, although not in sectors like construction and printing where market size 
and standardization were unimportant (Haydu, 1988). 
Clearly, we do not yet have a good formal model that can do justice to this historical 
experience. Equally, however, we are a lot closer to having such a model than was 
true even fifteen years ago . The challenge here is formidable because economic 
historians wish to treat so much as endogenous and have a more subtle view of the 
mainsprings of technological change than is yet embraced by modem growth 
economics . 
Nevertheless, the general message of this section is one of considerable progress in 
the range of useful models available for economic historians interested in growth 
and technological change and optimism about future prospects . If one were to 
construct what is hopefully a reasonably tractable wishlist for progress in this area, 
it would probably contain three key elements. First, that explicit attention be paid to 
the microeconomics of social capability with a view to developing more subtle 
measures of institutional differences between countries. Second, a related point, that 
the microeconomics of Gerschenkron's backwardness hypothesis are explored fully. 
Third, that the role of natural resources in economic growth is taken more seriously 
in models which consider induced effects on both institutional and technological 
change. 
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5. Concluding Comments 
The preceding two sections have attempted to demonstrate both the vitality and the 
increasing sophistication of quantitative economic history . Advances in economics 
and econometrics have enriched research in economic history and the field now has 
moved a long way beyond the early days chronicled by McCloskey (1978). At the 
same time, economic historians will do well to continue to resist mechanical and 
insensitive models that suppress key aspects of the past and ultimately impoverish 
historical research. Perhaps one of the most encouraging aspects of developments in 
economic modelling is that this is now less of a worry in many areas because of the 
increased subtlety of the economist's approach and the wider range of models that 
are available, for example, with regard to the ability to incorporate imperfect 
competition and asyrnrnetric information in many situations where they used to be 
assumed away . There is every reason to believe that this progress should continue 
and that economics will continue to become more useful to economic history as it 
comes to terms with the complexities of economic life that were previously regarded 
as 'too difficult' to model. 
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Table 1. Male Height, 1800-1950. (cm) 
1800 1850 1900 1950 
Australia 172.7 170.9 173 .8 
France 163.7 164.7 166.6 172.3 
Gennany 162.6 169 176.3 
Japan 157.1 155 157 162 
Netherlands 167.8 167.4 170.0 178.1 
Sweden 167.0 168.2 172.5 177.9 
UK 168.9 165.3 169.3 174.1 
USA 172.9 171.1 170.0 177.1 
Source: derived from Steckel and Floud ( 1997, Table 11 .1); estimates refer to cohorts born in 
the year stated. 
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Table 2. The Human Development Index, 1870 and 1973. 
GDPlHead Life Literacy Emolment IIDI 
($ I 990int) Expectancy (%) (%) 
1870 
France 1858 42.0 69 40.7 0.400 
Germany 1913 36.2 80 41.6 0.397 
Italy 1467 28.0 32 16.3 0.187 
UK 3263 41.3 76 35.4 0.496 
USA 2457 44.0 75 43.8 0.466 
1973 
France 12940 72.4 97 66.7 0.881 
Germany 13152 70.6 99 66.6 0.876 
Italy 10409 72.1 94 58.4 0.862 
UK 11992 72.0 99 66.7 0.883 
USA 16607 71.3 99 83.1 0.900 
China 1186 63.2 27 64.2 0.407 
India 853 50.3 34 28.1 0.289 
Sri Lanka 1733 65.0 77 49.0 0.547 
Source: Crafts (1997a, Tables 1, 4 and 5). 
The IIDI is defined as follows: 
Life Expectancy (L) (eo - 25)/(85 - 25) 
Schooling (S) 0.67LIT + 0.33ENROL 
Income (I) (Y.dj - 200)1(5385 - 200) 
Each of these components has a value between 0 and I as does IIDI = (L + S + 1)/3. 
Adjusted income is measured by the following formula which heavily discounts income 
above the threshold level, y' = 5120 ($ I 990int) 
Yadj i + 2[(y - yy2] for i < y < 2y' 
Yadj y' + 2[(y - y')"2] + 3[(y - 2yy3] for2y' < y < 3y' 
and so on. $5385 is an approximate maximum for this formula. 
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Table 3. Growth Rates Adjusted for Changes in Mortality and Leisure (% per 
year) 
Adjusted for 
GDPlHead Mortality Mortality & Leisure 
1870-1913 
France 1.5 1.9 2.1 
Germany 1.6 2.2 2.4 
Italy 1.3 2.2 2.5 
UK 1.0 1.6 1.8 
USA 1.8 2.1 2.2 
1913-1950 
France l.l 1.8 2.1 
Germany 0.3 1.1 1.2 
Italy 0.8 1.6 2.6 
UK 0.8 1.5 1.8 
USA 1.6 2.4 2.8 
1950-1973 
France 4.0 4.5 5.4 
Germany 5.0 5.3 6.1 
Italy 5.0 5.6 5.9 
UK 2.5 2.8 3.2 
USA 2.4 2.6 2.9 
1973-1992 
France 1.7 2.2 3.0 
Germany 2.1 2.7 3.1 
Italy 2.4 3.0 3.0 
UK 1.4 1.9 2.5 
USA 1.4 2.0 1.5 
Source: Crafts (1997a, Table 7) 
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Table 4. Living Standards in Industrial Revolution Britain 
1760 1780 1800 1820 1830 1850 
Components 
Real GDPlHead 1803 1787 1936 2099 2209 2846 
Life Expectancy 34.2 34.7 35.9 39.2 40.8 39.5 
Infant Mortality 174 173 145 154 149 156 
Literacy 48.5 49.5 52.5 54.5 57.5 61.5 
Schooling 1.4 1.5 1.8 2.0 2.3 2.7 
Political Rights 3 3 3 3 3 3 
Civil Rights 3 3 4 4 3 
Indices 
Heights 167.4 168.0 168.9 170.7 170.7 165.3 
HDI 0.272 0.277 0.302 0.337 0.361 0.407 
Quality of Life 6 5 4 3 2 1 
GDr 0.232 0.240 0.263 0.283 0.309 0.335 
DAHDI 0.216 0.238 0.307/0.321 
Sources: based on Crafts (1 997b) where details of the formulae for GDr and DAHDI are set 
out. HDI is calculated on an earlier version than that in Table 2 which uses years of schooling 
rather than enrolment. Real GDPlHead is in the 1990 international dollars employed by 
Maddison (1995). The rights variables are based on the concepts used by Dasgupta and Weale 
(1992) 
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Table 5. Sources of Growth: Golden Age OEeD vs Recent East Asia (% per 
year) 
Capital Labour TFP Output 
1950-73 
France 1.6 0.3 3.1 5.0 
Italy 1.6 0.2 3.2 5.0 
Japan 3.1 2.5 3.6 9.2 
UK 1.6 0.2 1.2 3.0 
West Gennany 2.2 0.5 3.3 6.0 
1960-94 
China (1) 2.3 1.9 2.6 6.8 
China (2) 4.0 2.1 4.6 10.7 
Hong Kong 2.8 2.1 2.4 7.3 
Indonesia 2.9 1.9 0.8 5.6 
Korea 4.3 2.5 1.5 8.3 
Malaysia 3.4 2.5 0.9 6.8 
Philippines 2. 1 2.1 -0.4 3.8 
Singapore 4.4 2.2 1.5 8.1 
Taiwan 4.1 2.4 2.0 8.5 
Thailand 3.7 2.0 1.8 7.5 
Sources: Europe and Japan from Maddison (1996) except Italy from Rossi et al. (1992); East 
Asia derived from Collins and Bosworth (1996) except for Hong Kong which is based on 
Young (1995) with factor shares adjusted to match Collins and Bosworth's assumptions. 
China (1) is for 1960-1994; China (2) is for 1984-1994. 
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Table 6. Real GDP/Person and Real GDP/Hour Worked, 1996 ($1990 
international) 
GDPlPerson GDPlHour Worked 
Norway 22256 32.46 
Switzerland 20252 23.17 
Denmark 19803 24.85 
West Gennany 19622 29.68 
Netherlands 18504 31.26 
France 18207 28.47 
Austria 17951 24.76 
Belgium 17756 29.84 
Sweden 17566 25.35 
UK 17326 22.68 
Italy 16814 26.23 
Finland 15864 21.67 
Ireland 15820 25.43 
Spain 13132 23.50 
Portugal 12015 14.09 
Greece 10950 17.08 
Hong Kong 21201 18.81 
Singapore 20983 15.87 
Japan 19582 20.06 
Taiwan 14222 14.28 
Korea 12874 11.70 
Malaysia 7764 
Thailand 6112 4.51 
China 4551 
Indonesia 3464 3.75 
Philippines 2369 2.87 
Sources: GDP and population from Maddison (1995) (1997) and Asian Development Bank 
(1997); hours worked from Crafts (1998a). 
45 
Table 7. Projected vs Actual TFP Growth (% pel;' year) 
Years of Gap Projected Actual 
Schooling TFP Growth TFP Growth 
1950-73 
France 8.2 1.84 J.3 3.1 
Italy 4.9 2.81 1.4 3.2 
Japan 8.1 5.13 3.6 3.6 
UK 9.4 1.40 l.l 1.2 
West Germany 8.5 2.25 1.7 3.3 
1960-84 
China 1.7 12.75 3.3 1.8 
Hong Kong 5.2 3.48 1.8 2.4 
Indonesia l.l 9.90 2.1 0.8 
Korea 3.2 8.60 3.1 1.5 
Malaysia 2.3 5.74 1.7 0.9 
Philippines 3.8 7.52 3.0 -0.4 
Singapore 3.0 5.62 2.0 1.5 
Taiwan 3.2 8.00 2.9 2.0 
Thailand 3.5 10.88 4.2 1.8 
1984-94 
China 3.6 9.62 3.8 4.6 
Indonesia 5.0 9.86 4.0 0.9 
Korea 9.7 3.47 2.4 2.1 
Malaysia 7.0 4.32 2.2 1.4 
Philippines 7.4 9.67 5.8 -0.9 
Singapore 6.1 1.92 0.9 3.1 
Taiwan 6.2 2.79 1.7 2.8 
Thailand 7.5 7.20 3.6 3.3 
Sources: Crafts (1998a); the weighting formula to derive column (3) is taken from Benhabib 
and Spiegel (1994) and Gap is defined as the ratio of the highest GDP/person to that of the 
country concerned in the initial year. 
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Table 8. Revealed Comparative Advantage in American and British 
Manufacturing 
UKRankings USA Rankings 
1913 1929 1913 1929 
Agricultural Equipment 10 16 2 I 
Cars and Aircraft 12 14 4 2 
Non-Ferrous Meatls 16 13 1 3 
Industrial equipment 5 8 3 4 
Electricals 8 7 5 5 
Books and Films 13 6 10 6 
Metal Manufactures 7 11 6 7 
Iron and Steel 3 4 9 8 
Chemicals 11 10 12 9 
Wood and Leather 15 15 7 10 
Rail and Ship 8 11 
Brick and Glass 14 12 11 12 
Apparel 6 9 14 13 
Fancy Goods 9 5 13 14 
Alcohol and Tobacco 4 2 15 15 
Textiles 2 3 16 16 
Source: Crafts (1989); revealed comparative advantage is based on rankings of sectors by 
world market share where 1 is highest. 
47 
References 
Abramovitz, M. (1986), Catching-Up, Forging Ahead, and Falling Behind, Journal 
of Economic History, 36, n.2, pp. 385-406. 
Abramovitz, M. and P. David (1998), American macroeconomic growth in the era 
of knowledge-based progress: the long-run perspective, in: S. L. Engerman and R. 
E. Gallmann (eds .), An Economic History of the United States , Cambridge, 
Cambridge University Press , forthcoming. 
Aghion, P. and P. Howitt (1997), Endogenous Growth Theory, Cambridge, Mass . , 
MIT Press. 
Amsden, A. H. (1989), Asia's Next Giant , New York, Oxford University Press. 
Asian Development Bank (1 997), Asian Development Outlook 1997 and 1998, New 
York, Oxford University Press. 
Baldwin, R. (1989), The Growth Effects of 1992, Economic Policy, 9, 248-281. 
Barro, R. J. (1997), Determinants of Economic Growth, Cambridge, Mass., MIT 
Press . 
Bean, C. and N. F. R. Crafts (1996) , British economic growth since 1945: relative 
economic decline ... and renaissance?, in: N. F. R. Crafts and G. Toniolo (eds.), 
Economic growth in Europe since 1945, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 
pp. l31-172. 
Bell, M. and K. Pavitt (1993), Technological Accumulation and Industrial Growth: 
Contrasts between Developed and Developing Countries, Industrial and Corporate 
Change, 2, n.2, pp. 157-210. 
Benhabib, J . and M. M. Spiegel (1994), The Role of Human Capital in Economic 
Development: Evidence from Cross-Country Data, Journal of Monetary Economics , 
34, n.2, pp. 143-173. 
Bernard, A. B. and S. N. Durlauf (1995), Convergence in International Output, 
Journal of Applied Econometrics, 10, n. l , pp. 97-108. 
Brezis, E. S., P. R. Krugman and D. Tsiddon (1993), Leapfrogging in International 
Competition: A Theory of Cycles in Technological Leadership, American Economic 
Review, 83, n.4, pp. 1211-1219. 
48 
Cain, L. P. and D. G. Paterson (1986), Biased Technical Change, Scale and Factor 
Substitution in American Industry, 1850-1919, Journal of Economic History, 46, 
n. l,pp. 153-164. 
Clark, G. (1987), Why Isn't the Whole World Developed? Lessons from the Cotton 
Mills, Journal of Economic History, 47, n. l, pp. 141-173 . 
Coli ins , S. M. and B. P. Bosworth (1996), Economic Growth in East Asia: 
Accumulation versus Assimilation, Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 2, pp . 
135-191. 
Costa, D. L. and R. H. Steckel (1997), Long term trends in health, welfare, and 
economic growth in the United States, in: R. H. Steckel and R. Floud (eds.), Health 
and welfare during industrialization, Chicago , University of Chicago Press, pp . 47-
89. 
Crafts, N. F. R (1987) , Economic history, in: J. Eatwell, M. Milgate and P. 
Newman (eds.), The New Palgrave: a dictionary of economic theory and doctrine, 
vol. 2, London, Macmillan, pp.37-42. 
Crafts, N. F. R. (1989), Revealed Comparative Advantage in Manufacturing, 1899-
1950, Journal of European Economic History, 18, n.1, pp. 127-137. 
Crafts, N. F. R. (1995), Exogenous or Endogenous Growth: the Industrial 
Revolution Reconsidered, Journal of Economic History, 55, nA, pp. 745-772 . 
Crafts, N. F. R. (1997a), The Human Development Index and Changes in Standards 
of Living: Some Historical Comparisons, European Review of Economic History, 1, 
n.3, pp. 299-322 . 
Crafts, N. F. R. (1997b), Some Dimensions of the 'Quality of Life' during the 
British Industrial Revolution, Economic History Review, 50, nA, pp. 617-639. 
Crafts, N. F. R. (1998a), East Asian growth before and after the crisis, in: IMF, 
Working Paper, n.98/137 . 
Crafts, N. F. R. (1998b), Forging Ahead and Falling Behind: The Rise and Relative 
Decline of the First Industrial Nation, Journal of Economic Perspectives, 12, n.2, 
pp. 193-210. 
Crafts, N. F. R. and C. K. Harley (1992), Output Growth and the British Industrial 
Revolution: A Restatement of the Crafts-Harley View, Economic History Review, 
45, nA, pp. 703-730. 
49 
Crafts , N. F . R. and T. C. Mills (1994) , Trends in Real Wages in Britain, 1750-
1913, Explorations in Economic History, 31, n.2, pp. 176-194. 
Dasgupta, P . and M. Weale (1992), On Measuring the Quality of Life, World 
Development, 20, n.2, pp. 119-131. 
David, P . and G. Wright, "Increasing Returns and the Genesis of American 
Resource Abundance, Industrial and Corporate Change, 6, n.2, pp. 203-245. 
EBRD (1997), Transition Report, London. 
Engerman, S. L. (1972), The Slave Trade and British Capital Formation in the 
Eighteenth Century : a Comment on the Williams Thesis, Business History Review, 
46, n.4 , pp. 430-443 . 
Engerman, S. L. (1997), The standard of living debate in international perspective: 
measures and indicators , in: R. H. Steckel and R. Fioud (eds.), Health and welfare 
during industrialization, Chicago, University of Chicago Press, pp. 17-45 . 
Feinstein, C. H . (1995), Changes in nominal wages, the cost of living and real 
wages in the United Kingdom over two centuries, 1780-1990, in:P. Scholliers and 
V. Zamagni (eds .), Labour's reward, Aldershot, Edward Elgar, pp. 3-36. 
Fishlow, A. (1974) , The New Economic History Revisited, Journal of European 
Economic History, 3, n .3, pp. 453-467. 
Floud, R. and B. Harris (1997), Health, height, and welfare: Britain, 1700-1980, in: 
R. H. Steckel and R. Fioud (eds .), Health and welfare during industrialization, 
Chicago, University of Chicago Press, pp. 91-126. 
Fioud, R. and D. N . McCloskey (eds .) (1981) , The Economic History of Britain 
since 1700, vo!. 1, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press . 
Fioud, R., K. W. Wachter and A. Gregory (1990), Health, Height and History , 
Cambridge, Cambridge University Press. 
Fogel, R. W. (1964), Railroads and American Economic Growth: Essays in 
Econometric History, Baltimore, Johns Hopkins University Press . 
Fogel, R. W. (1982), Circumstantial evidence in 'scientific' and traditional history, 
in: D. Carr et a!. (eds .), Philosophy of history and contemporary historiography, 
Ottawa, University of Ottawa Press, pp. 
50 
Gerschenkron, A. (1962) , Economic Backwardness in Historical Perspective, 
Cambridge, Mass ., Belknap Press . 
Gormely, P. J. (1995), The Human Development Index in 1994: Impact of Income 
on Country Rank, Journal of Economic and Social Measurement, 21, n.3, pp. 253-
267. 
Grossman, G. M. and E. Helpman (1991), Innovation and Growth in the Global 
Economy, Cambridge, Mass. , MIT Press . 
Habakkuk, H. J. (1962) , American and British Technology in the Nineteenth 
Century, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press . 
Harley, C. K. (1982) , British Industrialization before 1841: Evidence of Slower 
Growth during the Industrial Revolution, Journal of Economic History, vol. 42, n.2, 
pp. 267-289 . 
Haydu, 1. (1988), Employers , Unions and American Exceptionalism: Pre-World 
War I Open Shops in the Machine Trades in Comparative Perspective, International 
Journal of Social History , 33, n.1, pp. 25-41. 
Horrell, S. and J. Humphries (1992), Old Questions, New Data, and Alternative 
Perspectives : Families' Living Standards during the Industrial Revolution, Journal 
of Economic History, 52, n.4, pp. 849-880. 
Islam, N. (1995) , Growth Empirics: A Panel Data Approach, Quarterly Journal of 
Economics, 110, n.4, pp. 1127-1170. 
Jaffe, A. B. (1988), Demand and Supply Influences in Rand D Intensity and 
Productivity Growth, Review of Economics and Statistics, 72, n.3, pp. 431-437 . 
Knack, S. and P. Keefer (1995), Institutions and Economic Performance: Cross-
Country Tests using Alternative Institutional Measures, Economics and Politics , 7, 
n.3, pp. 207-227. 
Komlos, 1. (1995) , The Biological Standard of Living on Three Continents , Oxford, 
Westview Press. 
Kreps, D. M. (1990), Game Theory and Economic Modelling , Oxford, Oxford 
University Press. 
Krugman, P. (1987), The Narrow Moving Band, the Dutch Disease, and the 
Competitive Consequences of Mrs Thatcher, Journal of Development Economics , 
27, n. 1, pp. 41-55 . 
51 
Landes, D. S. (1969), The Unbound Prometheus, Cambridge, Cambridge University 
Press . 
Lee , J-W (1995), Government Interventions and Productivity Growth in Korean 
Manufacturing Industries, National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper, 
n. 5060. 
Levin, R. C., A. K. Klevonick, R. R. Nelson and S. G. Winter (1987), 
Appropriating the Returns from Industrial R & D, Brookings Papers on Economic 
Activity, n.3, 783-820. 
Lindert, P. H. (1994), Unequal living standards, in: R . Floud and D. McCloskey 
(eds.), The economic history of Britain since 1700, vo!. I , Cambridge, Cambridge 
University Press , pp.357-386 . 
Lindert, P. H . and J. G. Williamson, English Workers' Living Standards during the 
Industrial Revolution, Economic History Review, 36, n.1. 1-25. 
Lucas , R. E. JT. (1988), On the Mechanics of Economic Development, Journal of 
Monetary Economics, 22, n. l , pp . 3-42. 
Lucas , R. E. JT. (1993), Making a Miracle, Econometrica, 61, n.2, pp. 251 -272. 
McClelland, P. D. (1975), Causal Explanation and Model Building in History, 
Economics and the New Economic History, Ithaca, Comel! University Press . 
McCloskey, D. N. (1970), Did Victorian Britain Fail?, Economic History Review, 
23, n.3, pp. 446-459 . 
McCloskey, D. N. (1978), The Achievements of the Cliometric School, Journal of 
Economic History , vol38, n. I , pp. 13-28. 
Maddison, A. (1995), Monitoring the World Economy, 1820-1992, Paris: OECD . 
Maddison, A. (1996), Macroeconomic accounts for European countries, in: B. van 
Ark and N. F . R. Crafts (eds .), Quantitative aspects of postwar European economic 
growth, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, pp. 27-83 . 
Maddison, A. (1997) , The Nature and Functioning of European Capitalism: A 
Historical and Comparative Perspective, mimeo, Groningen Growth and 
Development Centre. 
52 
Mankiw, N. G., D. Romer and D. Weil (1992), A Contribution to the Empirics of 
Economic Growth, Quarterly Journal of Economics, 107, n.2, pp. 407-438. 
Matthews, R. C. 0., C. H. Feinstein and J. Odling-Smee (1983), British Economic 
Growth, 1856-1973, Stanford, Stanford University Press . 
Mauro, P. (1995), Corruption and Growth, Quarterly Journal of Economics, 110, 
n.3, pp. 681-712. 
Milbourne, R. (1995), Factor Convergence versus Productivity Convergence, paper 
presented to the 7th World Econometrics Congress, Tokyo. 
Miller, M. and P. Luangaram (1998), Financial Crisis in East Asia : Bank Runs, 
Asset Bubbles and Antidotes, National Institute Economic Review, 165, 66-82. 
Mills, T. C. and N. F. R. Crafts (1996), Trend Growth in British Industrial Output, 
1700-1913: a Reappraisal, Explorations in Economic History, 33, n. 3,277-295. 
Mills, T . C. and N. F. R. Crafts (1999), After the Golden Age: A Long Run 
Perspective on Growth Rates that Speeded Up, Slowed Down and Still Differ, The 
Manchester School, forthcoming. 
Mokyr, J. (1977), Demand versus Supply in the Industrial Revolution, Journal of 
Economic History, 37, n.4, 981-1008. 
Mokyr, J. (1993), Introduction: the new economic history and the industrial 
revolution, in: 1. Mokyr (ed.), The British irulustrial revolution: an economic 
perspective, Oxford, Westview Press, pp. 1-131. 
Morrison, C. J. (1993), A Microeconomic Approach to the Measurement of 
Economic Performance, Berlin, Springer-Verlag. 
Nelson, R. R. and G. Wright, The Rise and Fall of American Technological 
Leadership: the Postwar Era in Historical Perspective, Journal of Economic 
Literature, 30, n.4, pp. 1931-1964. 
Nordhaus, W. D. and 1. Tobin (1972), Is Growth Obsolete?, New York, Columbia 
University Press. 
North, D. C. and Thomas, R. P. (1973), The Rise of the Western World: A New 
Economic History, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press. 
O'Brien, P . (1977), The New Economic History of the Railways, London, Croom 
Helm. 
53 
O'Rourke, K. H. and J. G. WiLliamson (1994), Late Nineteenth Century Anglo-
American Factor Price Convergence: were Hecksher and Ohlin Right?, Journal of 
Economic History, 54, n. 4, pp. 892-916. 
O'Rourke, K. H . and J. G. Williamson (1995) , Open Economy Forces and late 
Nineteenth Century Swedish Catch-Up, Scandinavian Economic History Review, 43 , 
n. 1, 171-203. 
Patel, P. and K. Pavitt (1992), The Innovative Performance of the World's Largest 
Firms: Some New Evidence, Economics of Innovation and New Technology, 2, n.l, 
pp. 91-102. 
Phelps-Brown, E. H. (1977), The Inequality of Pay, Oxford, Oxford University 
Press. 
Prescott, E.C. (1998), Needed a Theory of Total Factor Productivity, International 
Economic Review, 39, n.3, 525-551. 
Preston, S.H. (1975) , The changing relation between mortality and level of 
economic development, Population Studies , 29, n.2, 231-248 . 
Qizilbash, M. (1997) , Pluralism and Well-Being Indices, World Development, 25 , 
n.12 , pp. 2009-2026 . 
Rodrik, D. (1995), Getting Policy Interventions Right: How South Korea and 
Taiwan Grew Rich , Economic Policy , 20, pp. 55-107 . 
Rodrik, D. (1997), TFPG Controversies, Institutions and Economic Performance in 
East Asia, Centre for Economic Policy Research Discussion Paper n. 1587. 
Romer, P. M. (1993), Idea Gaps and Object Gaps in Economic Development, 
Journal of Monetary Economics, 32, n.3, pp. 543-573 . 
Rossi, N., A. Sorgato and G. Toniolo (1992), Italian Historical Statistics, 1890-
1990, University of Venice Dipartimemo di Scienze Economiche Working Paper n. 
92-18 . 
Rossi , N, and G. Toniolo (1991), Catching Up or Falling Behind? Italy's Economic 
Growth, 1895-1947, Economic History Review, 45, n.3, pp. 537-563 . 
Rossi , N. and G. Toniolo (1 996), Italy, in: N. F. R. Crafts and G. Toniolo (eds.), 
Economic growth in Europe since 1945, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press , 
pp. 427-454. 
54 
Rostow, W. W. (1960), The Stages of Economic Growth, Cambridge, Cambridge 
University Press . 
Sandberg, L. G. (1981), The entrepreneur and technological change, in: R. C. 
Floud and D. N. McCloskey (eds .), The economic history of Britain since 1700, 
vo!. 2, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, pp. 99-120. 
Shapiro, M. and D.Wilcox (1996), Mismeasurement in the Consumer Price Index, 
National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper No. 5590. 
Smith, H. (1995), Industry Policy in East Asia, Asian-Pacific Economic Literature, 
9, n. l, pp. 17-39. 
Steckel, R. H. (1983), Height and Per Capita Income, Historical Methods, 16, pp . 
1-7. 
Steckel , R. H. (1992), Stature and living standards in the United States , in: R. E. 
GalImann and J. J. Wallis (eds .), American economic growth and standards of living 
before the civil war, Chicago, University of Chicago Press , pp. 265-308. 
Steckel, R. H. (1995), Stature and the Standard of Living, Journal of Economic 
Literature, 33, n.4, pp. 1903-1940 
Steckel, R. H. and Floud, R. (1997), Conclusions , in: R. H. Steckel and R. Floud 
(eds .) , Health and welfare during industrialization, Chicago, University of Chicago 
Press, pp. 423-449. 
Szreter, S. (1997), Economic Growth, Disruption, Disease and Death: On the 
Importance of the Politics of Public Health for Development, Population and 
Development Review, 23, n.4, pp. 693-728. 
Szreter, S. and G. Mooney, Urbanization, Mortality and the Standard of Living 
Debate: New Estimates of the Expectation of Life at Birth in Nineteenth Century 
British Cities, Economic History Review, 51, n.4, pp. 84-112. 
Taylor, C. T. and D. A. Jodice (1983), World Handbook of Political and Social 
Indicators, New Haven, Yale University Press . 
Usher, D. (1 980) , The Measurement of Economic Growth, Oxford, Blackwell. 
Venables, A. 1. and M. Gasiorek (1998), The Welfare Implications of Transport 
Improvements in the Presence of Market Failure, mimeo, DETR, London. 
55 
Voth, H-J. (1998), Time and Work in Eighteenth Century London, Journal of 
Economic History, 58, n. l, pp. 29-58. 
Wachter, K. W. and T. J. Trussell (1982), Estimating Historical Heights, Journal of 
the American Statistical Association, 77, n.2, pp. 277-293. 
Wade. R. (1990), Governing the Market , Princeton, Princeton University Press . 
Watkins , S. C. (1986), Conclusions, in: A. J . Coale and S. C. Watkins (eds. ), The 
decline offenUity in Europe, Princeton, Princeton University Press , pp. 420-449. 
Weingast, B. (1995), The Economic Role of Political Institutions: Market-
Preserving Fiscal Federalism and Economic Development, Journal of Law, 
Economics, and Organization, 11 , n.1, p. 1-31. 
Williamson, J . G. (1984), British Mortality and the Value of Life, 1781-1931, 
Population Studies, 38, n.2, pp. 157-172. 
Williamson, J. G. (1990), Coping with City Growth during the Industrial 
Revolution, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press. 
Williamson, J. G, 91996), Globalization, Convergence, and History , Journal of 
Economic History , 56, n.2., pp. 277-306. 
Wright, G. (1990), The Origins of American Industrial Success , 1879-1940, 
American Economic Review, 80, n.3, pp. 651-668. 
Wrig1ey, E. A. and R. Schofield (1981) , The Population History of England, 1541-
1871, London, Arnold . 
Young, A. (1995), The Tyranny of Numbers: Confronting the Statistical Realities of 
the East Asian Growth Experience, Quanerly Journal of Economics, 110, n.3, pp. 
641-680. 
56 
LONDON SCHOOL OF ECONONUCS 
ECONONUC mSTORY DEPARTMENT WORKING PAPERS 
1992 
1. Competing Notions of "Competition" in Late-Nineteenth Century American 
Economics 
Mary S. Morgan 
2. New Light Through Old Windows: A New Perspective on the British 
Economy in the Second World War 
Peter Howlett 
3. Social Risk and Social Welfare in Britain, 1870-1939 
Paul lohnson 
4. Textile Factories , Tuberculosis and the Quality of Life in Industrializing 
Japan 
lanet Hunter 
5. European Emigration 1815-1930. Looking at the Emigration Decision Again 
Du.dley Baines 
6. Scale Bias & State Building: an Historical Perspective on Government 
Intervention, Political Systems & Economic Performance in Tropical Africa 
Gareth Austin 
7. Class Law in Victorian England 
Paul lohnson 
8. The instituto Nacional de Prevision Social and Social Insurance Reform in 
Argentina, 1944 to 1953 
Peter Lloyd-Sherlock 
9. Human Capital and Payment Systems in Britain, 1833-1914 
Dudley Baines, Peter Howlett, Paul lohnson 
10. Much Ado About Litlle 
Roben Humphreys 




12. The Performance of Public Enterprises in South Africa, Zambia and 
Zimbabwe during the last two decades 
David Ferreira 
13. Political Primacy in Economic Laws: A Comparison of British and American 
Anti-dumping Legislation, 1921 
Peter M. Richards 
14. Scientific Charity in Victorian London. Claims and Achievements of the 
Charity Organisation Society, 1869-1890 
Roben Humphreys 
15 . Essex Men Vindicated: Output, Incomes and Investment in Agriculture, 
1850-73 
E.H. Hunt and S.l . Pam 
1994 
16. Learning by Doing among Victorian Farmworkers : A case study in the 
Biological and Cognitive Foundations of Skill Acquisition 
David Mitch 
17. "Blind Alley" Employment and the Role of Adolescent Labor Force 
Experience in Skill Development in Late 19th and Early 20th Century 
England 
David Mitch 
18. British Imperialism in Microcosm: The Annexation of the Cocos (Keeling) 
Islands 
Margaret Ackrill 
19 . Short-termism on Trial: An Empirical Approach 
Breht Feigh 
20. Tenancy and Agricultural Techniques: Evidence from the 1882 Commission 
David Coombs 
21. Economic Distress and Unemployment in Australia since 1850 
Paul lohnson 
22. Freedom and Growth. The European Miracle? 
S.R. Epstein 
23. Bygone Charity - Myths and Realities 
Robert Humphreys 
24. Late Economic Development in a Regional Context 
Domingos Giroletti, Max-Stephan Schulze, Carles SuLiriil 
1995 
25. How Important was Tariff Protection for Spanish Farming prior to 1936? 
lames Simpson 
26. British Business in Argentina 
Colin M. Lewis 
27. The Principal-Agent Question: the Chartered Trading Companies 
S.P. Ville and S.R.H. lanes 
28. Craft Guilds, Apprenticeship and Technological Change in Pre-Modern 
Europe 
S.R. Epstein 
29. The ' Quality of Life': Lessons for and from the British Industrial Revolution 
N. F. R. Crafts 
1996 
30. Transplanting Economic Ideas: International Coercion and Native Policy 
loanna Pepelasis Minoglou 
31 . Creditors, Debtors and the Law in Victorian and Edwardian England 
Paul lohnson 
32. Population Growth and the Dynamics of Canadian Development: A 
Multivariate Time Series Approach 
Alan G. Green and Gordon R. Sparks 
33. The Human Development Index: Some Historical Comparisons 
N.F.R. Crafts 
34. The Character of "Rational Economic Man" 
Mary S. Morgan 
1997 
35. Were British "Business Cycles" Cyclical? Evidence from Historical 
Statistics, 1700-1913 
Philip Epstein 
36. Re-Estimating Austrian GDP, 1870-1913: Methods and Sources 
Max-Stephan Schulze 
37. The labour force participation and economic well-being of older men in 
London, 1929-31 
Dudley Baines and Paul Johnson 
38. -Pawns will live when slaves is apt to dye ' : Credit, Slaving and Pawnship at 
Old Calabar in the era of the Slave Trade 
Paul E. Lovejoy and David Richardson 
1998 
39. The Abolition of Resale Price Maintenance in Britain in 1964: a turning point 
for British Manufacturers? 
Helen Mercer 
40. American Business Cycles since World War 11: Historical Behaviour and 
Statistical Representation 
Philip Epstein 
41 . Finance Capital in the Weimar Republic: Does evidence on supervisory board 
representation support Hilferding 's view of the role of large banks in German 
capitalism? 
Jeroen F. De Boer 
42. Productivity Growth during the First Industrial Revolution: Inferences from 
the Pattern of British External Trade 
C. Knick Harley and N.F.R. Crafts 
43. Clogs to Clogs in Three Generations? Explaining Entrepreneurial 
Performance in Britain since 1850 
Tom Nicholas 
44. Industrial Growth in the Third World, c.1870-c.1990: Depressions, Intra-
Regional Trade, and Ethnic Networks 
Edited by Gareth Austin 
45 . In search of the 'traditional ' working class: social mobility and occupational 
continuity in inter-war London 
Dudley Baines and Paul lohnson 
46 . The late medieval crisis as an 'integration crisis' 
S. R. Epslein 
1999 
47 . The Impact of American Aid in the Spanish Economy in the 1950s 
Oscar Calvo-Gonzalez 
48 . Quantitative Economic History 
N.F.R. Crafts 





